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UPWARD INFLUENCE IN JOINT VENTURES
Abstract
This paper addresses how joint venture nanagers can gain control over a
joint venture's destiny and what methods can be used to influence and gain
compliance from parent firms. The 3U year history of an international joint
venture is analyzed. Causal maps and control categories of upward influence
techniques are developed. Vie propose that joint venture autonomy may be
beneficial to the parent firms and identify that entrepreneurial leadership
and stakeholder support are the most influential techniques for gaining that
autonomy.
Funds for this research were supplied by the University of Illinois
Research Board, the Department of Business Administration, and the Hewlett
Fund.
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UPWARD INFLUENCE IN JOINT VENTURES
Upward influence in joint ventures exists as a natter of necessity.
Joint venture (JV) managers must be able to communicate upward to the parent
firms what must be done to keep the joint venture viable and competitive. At
some point of upward influence, however, the joint venture management begins
to gain strateyic control vis-a-vis the parent firms. To gain strategic
control means to acquire the authority to make decisions about the joint
venture's areas of business, product-market scope, resource deployment,
research and development, and competitive skills (Lorange, Scott Morton &
Ghoshal , 1986). Although it has been documented in a number of studies on
joint ventures that the JV management may attempt to gain control (Franko,
1971; Reynolds, 1984), no research has addressed the methods for achieving it.
Our objective is to analyze the process of upward influence in joint ventures
in order to better understand the process, how it is achieved, and the
implications of it to joint venture management and research.
Strategic control and upward influence are important issues in joint
ventures for three reasons. First, power and influence are important in
organizations in general (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). In joint venture
relationships, the parent firms are forced to share strategic control with
each other and consequently, must influence each other. Second, a joint
venture is an ongoing, evolving business, and therefore, the amount of
strategic control each parent and the JV management can and should exercise
changes over its life cycle. Finally, the JV agreement results in a new,
legally independent organization. The JV management is also interested in
influencing the strategic direction of its operations. Thus, important issues
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in managing joint ventures are the amount of control and influence which are
achievable and the amount of control and influence which are desirable for
each parent firm and for the joint venture management.
Previous work on JV control has been limited in three ways. First, work
has only considered strategic control issues at the JV's inception (Harrigan,
198b; Reynolds, 1984), Second, previous work has assumed that parent firms
desire to maximize their strategic control of joint ventures (Harrigan, 1985;
Killing, 1982). Finally previous work has concentrated on downward influence:
how parent firms can control the JV, but have ignored upward influence of the
JV management on its parent (Harrigan, 1985; Lyles, 1986). Upward influence
refers to the ability of the JV management to change the actions or decisions
of the parents in some intended fashion (Mowday, 1978).
The current research, on the other hand, considers upward influence
issues over the thirty year life of a joint venture. Vie also do not assume
maximum parental control is possible or desirable. The decision to joint
venture implies that the parent firms realize they do not have all the skills
necessary to be successful or they are unwilling to assume all of the risks of
the venture (Harrigan, 198b; Lyles, 1987). Therefore, parents should not
expect to control a JV or to impose their preferences upon the JV as
completely as they could an internal unit. In fact, in some cases, it is
possible that parent firms stifle a JV by overcontrol (Hladik, 1985). For
instance, if the JV is in new product or market areas, or is formed to explore
an unfamiliar technology, it may be desirable for the JV to have considerable
autonomy in strategic decision making. The parent firms are unlikely to
possess the necessary expertise to make wise strategic decisions for the JV,
and the JV may fail due to overcontrol.
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Finally, it is likely that the JV management will perceive the need for
autonomy before the parent firms are willing to relinquish control.
Therefore, it is likely that the JV management, for the good of the joint
venture, will desire to take actions to limit parental control and to increase
the JV autonomy. Upward influence of joint venture managers on parent firm
managers is an important and to date, unexplored issue.
Our objectives in this paper are twofold: to examine how the management
of a particular JV gained control of its strategy by limiting the influence of
the parent firms and to build a theory of how JV managers use upward influence
to gain strategic control. Focusing on upward influence by JV management
contributes to both the theory and practice of management of joint ventures.
JV upward influence may be a determinant of JV success and effectiveness
(Hladik, 1985). Consequently it is important to learn more about this
neglected area. In addition, since the JV management is in a relative power
disadvantage, the achievement of control and influence in strategic decision
making becomes an interesting organizational phenomenon in itself. In order
to study upward influence, we analyze the 3U year life of a joint venture to
provide a comprehensive set of categories of upward influence and explore
their effectiveness. Cognitive mapping techniques (Axelrod, 1976) are used to
analyze transcripts of interviews with high ranking officials involved with
the JV and to analyze company documents.
History of The Joint Venture
A short history of the joint venture is presented in Table 1. The joint
venture EIM was founded in 1946 by seven firms in order to manufacture
specialty industrial machine tools. At its inception, the goals of the parent
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firms varied. One American firm, ACE, desired to enter the European market
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
with its existing products and technology. The other American firm and the
European firms were interested primarily in assuring a reliable supplier to
tneir main business area. Therefore, ACE was using the joint venture for
horizontal geographic expansion; for the other firms the joint venture was a
way to backward integrate. In addition, the top management of the parent
firms had developed friendships with each other through their previous
business associations and desired to be part of a cooperative agreement that
would help rebuild war-torn Europe. All the parent firm managers had economic
goals (enter new markets, assure a reliable supplier), but they also had
strong social and colleagial goals.
For most of the life of the joint venture, it was managed by an American
entrepreneurial president who attempted to maintain the autonomy and growth of
the JV. Upon his retirement in 1968, he was replaced by an ACE-supplied
manager. In 197d, after 32 years as a joint venture, ACE acquired 1UU%
ownership. The JV was highly profitable throughout all of its life (except
the first years before the American manager arrived) and all parent firm
managers believed the JV was successful in meeting all of its goals.
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT OF UPWARD INFLUENCE
This section reports on the previous theoretical literature of influence
relationships within organizations. Most of the literature does not deal with
joint venture-parent relationships, but the general theoretical concepts are
useful to our analysis. We will address influence relationships in general,
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and upward influence and specific influence techniques in particular.
Influence Relationships
Power and influence have been largely addressed as a function of
legitimate power within hierarchical systems (Child, 1973; Cyert A March,
1963; Pfeffer & Salancik, 197u). This research base recognizes that an
influence relationship can be downward from supervisor to subordinate
(Stogdill, 19/4), lateral between peers (Strauss, 1962), or upward from
subordinate to superior (Mechanic, 1962). The ability to influence stems from
the personal characteristics of the individuals, from their location within
the organization, their role in the decision making process, and the resources
available to them (Mechanic, 1962; Patchen, 1974). The influence
relationships can be formal or informal (Mechanic, 1962).
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
The model of influencing relationships in Figure 1 shows the direction of
the relationships inherent in a JV arrangement. Among the parent firms, their
stakeholders, and the JV stakeholders, we find lateral relationships. Each is
assumed to be of relatively equal status, of about the same rank; however,
each also has its own specialized viewpoints. Within the lateral
relationships, the participants are theoretically equal in their ability to
influence each other: there are no hierarchical role expectations (Strauss,
1962).
The downward relationships show the JV as the target of influence by the
parent firms. Normally a downward relationship represents a dependent
relationship, in this case, because of the legitimate authority and the
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resource control that the parent has over the JV. There are built in
expectations that the JV does not have power and will defer in recognition of
the higher rank of the parent firms.
Upward influence from the JV to the parent firms automatically assumes a
disparity in power since the expectation is that the parent has more power in
decision-making than the JV. However, upward influence has been shown to be
necessary by subordinates in order to get the job done and to execute
agendas (Kanter, 1977; Kotter, 1986).
In a JV, it may be assumed that the legitimacy of the parent firms'
managers is not as readily accepted as in typical superior-subordinate
relationships for several reasons. First, the JV is legally a separate
independent corporation. Frequently the equity is divided among the parent
firms, and there is no dominant parent. Also the JV is often geographically
remote from the parent firms, giving the impression of independence and of
increased knowledge about the host country and the JV customers and markets.
These factors lead to an increased expectation that the JV management has a
legitimate right to exercise upward influence in order to affect parental
decisions that may affect the perceived goals of the JV management.
JV Upward Influence
It is thus expected that the JV management will attempt to influence the
parent firms because it is their responsibility to make sure that the JV
accomplishes its purposes and achieves its goals. They are the ones closest
to the operation of the JV.
The upward influence and strategic control literature provides some
guidance concerning how a JV manager might go about gaining autonomy and
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influencing parent firm managers. Schilit and Locke (1982) and Mowday (1978)
have provided an initial categorization of the types of methods that might be
used by a subordinate to influence his superior. These incude: rational
presentation of ideas, informal exchanges, upward appeal, threats,
manipulation, formation of coalitions, and persistence or asserti veness
.
Some research has addressed headquarters' control of subsidiaries, in
particular, control of joint ventures. Prahalad and Doz (1981) report that as
foreign subsidiaries mature, they become harder to control by headquarters.
They discuss the dilemma of MNCs in maintaining control over joint ventures
and suggest that headquarters cannot maintain control of the JV by relying on
control of strategic resources. As the JV matures it becomes independent by
developing control of its own resources: management, technological skills,
marketing knowledge, and innovative ideas. Looking at this argument in
reverse, as the JV or the subsidiary matures and gains these strategic
resources, it will be easier for it to gain influence vis-a-vis the parent
firms in strategic decision-making.
Harrigan (198b) also discusses parent or headquarters control over the
joint venture. Again the focus is on how the parent can control the joint
venture. She discusses the problems that autonomy of the joint venture brings
to the parent firm. According to Harrigan (1985), these problems include
coordination problems, unfulfilled synergies, technological development
problems, as well as other management problems.
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) provide some insights regarding how to
control stakeholders and to increase autonomy. Their perspective identifies
the importance of social controls and of managing the environmental demands.
In the case of JVs, environmental demands come from parent firms, customers,
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suppliers, competitors and governments. It is possible to establish a culture
for control (Jaeger & Baliga, 1985) and to create coalitions of the
stakeholders that may influence the parents of the JV. For example, JV
customers may tell the parent firm that they will only deal with the JV
directly or the host country government may be influenced by the JV to protect
the JV autonomy.
Upward Influence Techniques
Drawing on this literature, five distinct ways exist for the JV to gain
autonomy. Table 2 summarizes the mechanisms JV managers can use to influence
parent firms and to gain autonomy. First the JV can seek support from
outsiders by influencing, coalescing, and gaining information from its
customers, suppliers, licensors, competitors and government (Porter, 1980;
Harrigan, 1985; MacMillan & Jones, 1986; Pfeffer A Salancik, 1978). All of
these transactions can increase the JV's ability to negotiate with and
influence its parent firms. Furthermore, the JV can utilize its stakeholders
to directly influence the parent firms through the stakeholder-parent lateral
influence relationship.
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
Second, formal relationships with the parent firms can be used to gain
autonomy. These include structural reporting lines, dependency on parental
resources, product/market overlap, and technology. The more the JV
differentiates itself from its parents in terms of products, markets,
suppliers, and technology, the more autonomy the JV will have in making
decisions (Harrigan, 1985).
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Third, there are also informal mechanisms by which the JV can influence
the parent firms. It can play one parent against the others. Establishing
trust, applying pressure (sometimes threats), using informal contact and
agenda setting, and establishing a JV culture constitute methods for upward
influence (Jaeger & Baliga, 1985; Mowday, 1978; Schilit & Locke, 1982).
Fourth, the characteristics of the JV also influence its autonomy and its
resulting ability to control. For example, independent facilities, internal
functional areas, separate information systems and remote physical location
influence the ability of the parent to control the JV (Harrigan, 1985; Lyles,
1986; Ouchi, 1977).
Finally, the personal characteristics of the JV manager affect the
ability of the JV to influence the parent firms (Fiol, 1986; Lyles, 1986).
The more entrepreneurial the JV manager, the more he will attempt to gain
autonomy and to influence the parent firms. The more entrepreneurial he is,
the more he will want the JV to grow and to become a viable business on its
own
.
Thus, the five categories of upward influence techniques identified are
gaining support from stakeholders, formal and informal relationships with the
parent firms, JV characteristics, and personal characteristics of the JV
manager. The following research was undertaken to study the relative
importance of each method of influence and how each interrelates to increase
or decrease JV autonomy and upward influence.
METHODOLOGY
This study describes an in-depth analysis of one joint venture and the
methods used by the president of the joint venture to gain autonomy. An
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attempt was made to track the points in the history of the joint venture that
affected the ability of the President to influence the parent firms, to
understand the relationship among the tactics used and their impact, and how
these influenced the destiny of the joint venture. The purpose of the study
is theory-building. To the extent that the decision situations (topics and
process) are si mi 1 i ar to those faced by other managers, the findings may be
general izable to other JVs.
A tri angulation of data collection methods was used. In-depth interviews
were conducted with all managers and ex-managers of the JV, with ex-members of
the Board of Directors representing the parent firms, and with staff members
of the parent firm of ACE who had responsibility for the JV. The first author
has an ongoing research relationship with ACE in which she has been granted
access to managers and archival data on the firm's various joint ventures. In
all, about bU interviews were conducted in both the United States and in
Europe, and these lasted an average of two hours or more. The companies and
the people were very cooperative and allowed the researcher to return several
times for interviews. The researcher had the opportunity to raise additional
questions, to clarify certain events, or to probe deeper regarding the events
during follow up interviews.
In order to verify these verbal reports, two other kinds of data were
utilized: publicly available information such as annual reports and newspaper
clippings, and company archival data such as minutes from all the board
meetings from lybtt-1978, memos and other documents. These were all in
Engl ish.
The interviews were semi -structured. The participant was asked to
reconstruct the period of time in which he was directly involved with the JV.
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Questions regarding the impact of the JV President on the parent firms were
straightforward. For example, parent firm executives were asked to "tell me
all you can about Casey's management of the joint venture." Interviewees were
all fluent in English so all interviews were conducted in English by the first
author and were tape recorded. Tapes were transcribed by research assistants.
The accuracy of transcripts were checked by the first author against the
original recordings. The authors independently coded the interviews and data
to reflect the techniques, their impact, and the interrelationships. Any
uncertainty regarding the timing, the techniques, or the impact was verified
by going back to the archival data, by returning to the interviewees, or by
concensus between the researchers.
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Since the main focus of the present research effort is to better
understand the process of upward influence and the various techniques used to
achieve it within the context of an international joint venture, the data were
first coded into the upward influence techniques identified in the literature.
These represent gaining support from stakeholders, formal and informal
relationships with parental firms, the JV characteristics and the personal
characteristics of the JV president. How often each influence category was
employed and its impact on the joint venture's autonomy were noted and
results are summarized in Table 3.
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
As is evident from the table, the joint venture management used a wide
variety of techniques in seeking to gain autonomy. The JV sought support from
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outsiders 11 times, usually through licensing of products. Both formal (24
instances) and informal (16 instances) relationships with parent firms were
important vehicles through which the JV attempted to control its parents.
Finally, the JV characteristics were important determinants of the amount of
upward influence the JV president attempted to exert (18 instances). Overall,
the JV president was very interested in increasing his autonomy and used a
wide variety of techniques to exert upward influence.
This table also summarizes the impact of each of the upward influence
attempts. The JV manager was quite successful in gaining upward influence, as
49 of the 69 influence techniques that were coded proved successful (71%).
The entrepreneurial leadership of the JV president was most successful (1UU%),
followed by seeking support from outsiders (72%), resource independence (69%),
strategic differentiation (6«%) and informal relationships with parents (68%).
The use of structural reporting lines was the least effective techniques for
gaining autonomy (62%).
Although it proved impossible to develop a simple coding scheme of the
interaction of variables, we believe that the complex interaction of multiple
techniques used simultaneously by the JV president is responsible for the high
level of success of his upward influence attempts. For example, many upward
influence techniques were used concurrently and over several years. Thus, the
"playing parents against each other" while "influencing the parent's
stakeholders" and while "creating a superior product" created a strong
pressure point to influence the parent firm, certainly more than each
technique used singularly.
In order to explore these interelationships further, the data were then
divided into 17 separate episodes in which the JV President attempted to gain
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autonomy from one or more parent firms. The nature of these are listed in
the Appendix.
For each episode, a separate causal map was developed which graphically
depicts the interaction of factors that accounted for the success or failure
of the attempt (Axel rod, 1976; Roos & Hall, 1980; Weick & Bougon, 1986).
Cause maps were formed by coding causal assertions about the relationship
between variables pertaining to each of the 17 episodes. Following Axel rod
(ly76), the concepts that people use are represented as points and the causal
links between these concepts are represented as arrows. A positive causal
link is denoted with a + sign, a negative causal link with a - sign.
For each episode, transcripts from a number of informants and archival
data were coded for causal assertions concerning the episode. The earliest
maps, drawn by the second researcher, followed Axel rod's (1976) advice to use
the person's own wordiny of concepts and separate maps were drawn for each
informant. The authors sythesized the individual perceptions of the episode
into a group map (Eden, Jones & Sims, 1979, 1983) and wording of concepts were
fitted, as tar as possible, to that of the theoretical categories. In some
cases, the synthesis and recoding was simple and straightforward: the
perceptions of the various informants were similar and they employed
terminology similar to that of the theoretical categories. In other cases,
there existed multiple beliefs about an episode. In these cases, the two
researchers discussed the events and maps at length, occasionally returning to
informants for clarification, before a group cause map for the episode was
agreed upon. Group maps formed in this manner are called composite cause
maps (Weick & Bougon, 198b).
Three representative examples of attempts to gain autonomy are presented
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to illustrate the analysis and the results obtained.
Micro-flap 1. The first micro-map (Figure 2) summarizes a situation where
the joint venture found itself competing directly against one of its parent
firms. In this situation, the joint venture was competing with a superior
product against one of the parents in the parent's home territory. The main
upward influence issues illustrated by this case were compliance with parental
wishes, the joint venture's use of upward influence tactics and the autonomy
of the joint venture manager to make decisions against the direct wishes of
one of the parents. As shown in the first diagram below, the joint venture
was able to develop a product superior to its parent's because it had
developed its own R & P independently of the parent. The joint venture
management then enlisted the support of the parent's stakeholders, in this
case, customers, to help influence the parent to accept a decision that was
not to the parent's liking.
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
Micro-Map 2. The second episode illustrates eight separate attempts by
the joint venture president to gain autonomy through resource independence.
Over the years, the joint venture developed its own internal R & D, marketing
and manufacturing capabilities. It also gained financial independence by
paying off parental loans and becoming extremely profitable. It did not rely
on the parent for information about the technology, customers or product
design. The JV achieved parent compliance by getting the parent to go along
with or comply with the JV management's goals and direction. The parent firm
did not control critical resources that it could withhold from the JV to gain
its compliance.
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INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
As the second micro-nap shows (Figure 3), resource independence in this
case led to parental compliance with the president's decisions. The joint
venture was not dependent upon the parents to aid in implementation of the
JV's strategy. In addition, resource independence allowed the joint venture
to follow a product strategy that increased its profitability which increased
the parent's desire for control. Ultimately, one parent which desired greater
control because the JV was so profitable, but which was unable to gain the
control through other methods, increased its equity position.
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE
Micro-flap 3. The final micro-map illustrates the use of leadership
influence. Although the JV manager came from one of the American partners, he
acted independently and in an entrepreneurial manner throughout his tenure.
In this example, one American parent told him that it had formed a new Spanish
JV because the American parent thought it was impossible for a foreign firm to
set up a wholly-owned subsidiary in Spain. Without seeking approval from the
parent or his own board of directors, the president went to Spain and set up a
wholly-owned subsidiary of the joint venture. Although initially angry at the
president for acting on his own, the American partner soon began directing
their Spanish business through his subsidiary. The willingness of the JV
president to take an entrepreneurial leadership role was a significant factor
in the overall autonomy of this JV.
Global Causal Map. These three episodal causal maps, or micro maps, were
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combined with causal maps developed for each of the other 14 attempts to gain
joint venture autonomy to form a global causal map (Figure b). The global nap
also constitutes a composite map (Weick fl Bougon, 1986) in that it represents
the collective causal beliefs of all informants as it links the 17 episodes
into a macromap of causal relations. Although the map is drawn to primarily
show the factors affecting joint venture autonomy, the complex and circular
interaction of all of the variables suggest that joint venture autonomy
results from the interplay of various influencing variables. This research
suggests that joint venture autonomy and upward influence attempts at high
levels in organizations may be more complex than previously believed. The
analysis suggests that the relationships are neither simple, nor
unidirectional, nor linear.
INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE
The relationships evident in the micro-maps also hold in the global map.
However, the relationships are even more complex and interconnected than found
in any one episodal map. For instance, both JV leadership and resource
independence led to product proliferation. Although represented as
independent variables, it is most likely that product proliferation will occur
when both leadership and resource independence are present. The interaction
of other variables in the causal map follow similar patterns.
As the causal map in Figure 5 suggests, successful upward influence is a
complex phenomenon. The coding summarized in Table 3 also suggests that a
wider variety of techniques are available than any previous research project
has considered. The success of the various techniques may depend on the use
of several techniques simultaneously.
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CONCLUSIONS
The results of this study indicate that a JV that is controlled by its
own management can be successful and independent at the sane tine. Although
informants involved in the research believe the joint venture success is
related to JV autonomy, this is difficult to prove.
The success of the JV management in upward influence may be partially
determined by the mixed goals of the parents which allowed one parent to he
pitted against another to the JV's advantage. Financial success was not the
sole goal of the parent firms. In this case, the parent firms had a variety
of goals that influenced their involvement in the joint venture. These ranged
from the desirability of establishing a presence in Europe to social goals of
being part of a cohesive group. A joint venture that faces united parents may
be less successful in gaining autonomy.
Implications for Upward Influence Theory
This study illustrates that JV managers, despite a relative power
disadvantage, have a variety of techniques that may be successfully applied to
influence decision-making about the JV's future. The findings indicate that
JV managers may do a number of things to become independent of their parent
firms; e.g., develop its own resource base, develop multiple products
different from the parent firms, or develop products superior to the parent
firms'. The findings also indicate that JV managers utilize a variety of
techniques to influence the decisions made, such as personal interactions, the
development of a social culture, and the cooperation of those outside the
formal authority structure.
Referring back to Figure 1, the findings show that the JV management
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successfully utilized its stakeholders and the parent firms' stakeholders to
create pressure on the parent firms. Clearly as the power of buyers and/or
suppliers increases, they will be able to exert more influence on the parent
firms (Harrigan, 19ti3). The JV management found that it could successfully
influence the decisions about its future by influencing its stakeholders which
were, for all purposes, outside the chain of command. These findings support
the research of Mowday (197tt) on educational organizations.
The JV management successfully utilized indirect lateral relationships to
influence strategic decisions. This demonstrates that influencing through a
lateral relationship may be relatively easy because of perceived equivalency
in power and that those in a lateral relationship may be more likely to
cooperate than those in an upward relationship. If the stakeholders are
dependent upon the JV for products or services, they may be very willing to
cooperate with the JV if they think that they will gain from the decisions
made. Clearly, the timing of these influence techniques must be appropriate.
The findings do not indicate that the JV management developed a
systematic plan for gaining influence nor that the choices among alternative
methods of influence were well thought out. In fact, this study suggests that
despite an unplanned, opportunistic approach to upward influence, the
combination of techniques and the timing of them proved effective.
Implications for Parent Firm Managers
The implications of the study to parent firm managers are many. JV
parents need to make overt decisions regarding the desirability, degree and
areas of joint venture independence and autonomy (Lyles, 19&6). These
decisions should be reviewed periodically as the environmental conditions for
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the JV chanyes and as the JV matures and is better equipped to make wise
Strategic decisions on its own. In this particular case, the JV managenent
was gaining control throuyh upward influence techniques while the parent firms
were only somewhat aware of what was happening. At one point the JV president
said, "lie wanted to protect our own business and we were going to develop it.
The parents knew it and that was an open thing." However, several parent firm
executives expressed the belief that JV independence was not acceptable, and
some parent firm managers did not fully appreciate the future ramifications of
the JV's independent action.
Parents should also be aware what skills they are contributing to the JV
and thus, which activities they might control. There are also areas outside
the parent firm's expertise that they should not tightly control but rather
parents should choose JV partners partly for the areas of expertise they bring
to the venture. Firms must trust their JV partners to effectively control
their own areas of expertise in the JV.
Finally, decisions regarding the amount of desired JV autonomy must be
made. Especially as the JV gains viability, it will be advantageous for it to
be allowed to make certain decisions on its own. Thus, the parent firm can
use the JV to learn new skills from the other parents and from the JV itself
(Lyles, 1967).
The findings of this study shed preliminary light on issues regarding
parental control and self-control of joint ventures. The benefits of high
control to the parent firm are that it can control the direction of the joint
venture and limit its activities. Nonetheless, there are also benefits to be
gained by minimizing parental influence. These benefits are the
entrepreneurial spirit of the JV, the potential for innovation and
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technology development, the enhancement of the image of the parent firm as a
cooperative partner, and the continuation of the relationships with the other
partner firms.
There is a wide variety of factors that potentially may affect the
optimal amount of parental control and JV autonomy. The following factors are
suggestive of these:
The purpose of the JV is an important determinant of the optimal level of
JV autonomy. For instance, a JV formed to exploit new technology might
require more autonomy than a marketing-based JV.
Expertise of the parent firm and expertise of the other parents also
determines the amount and areas of control the parent should attempt to
exercise. Parents should only attempt to control areas of the JV business
that it understands, let other parents control the areas they understand and
give the JV autonomy in new areas in which parents have no expertise.
Competence of the JV management should also determine the degree of
autonomy the JV should enjoy. If parents agree that the JV should be
autonomous, it is imperative that they install entrepreneurial managers. On
the other hand, if the parents want centralized control, they should choose
administrators who can be more easily controlled. This also suggests that JV
autonomy should increase over time as the competence of the JV management
i ncreases
.
The amount of trust and the similarity of goals between parents also
affect the amount of control each parent should be willing to relinquish.
Parents that are unfamiliar with each others' goals, or who are establishing
their first JV, are more likely to perceive the need to control a JV (Lyles,
-22-
1987).
Finally, the similarity of the JV mission to the parent's missions in
terms of technology, markets, products and goals affects the optimal level of
JV autonomy. The more similar the mission, the more control that is desirable
and possible. With similar missions, the parent not only has skills needed to
control and help the JV, but it also needs to protect itself from the JV which
may one day become a competitor.
Implications for Researchers
Future studies in the area of upward influence in joint ventures should
attempt to control for mixed motives among the parent firms to determine which
upward influence methods are successful. Situational factors, such as number
of parent firms, location and percent of equity ownership should also be
examined and controlled. Finally, given the unique nature of each JV it is
difficult to find comparison cases, but in the future it should be attempted.
The use of cognitive mapping as a methodology proved to be a successful
technique for studying a complex phenomenon. It allowed the researchers the
opportunity of explaining the actions of the JV management and the consequences
of those actions. It proved a powerful method for indicating the relationships
and the patterns that existed that led to the upward influence outcomes. The
maps served as a guide to understanding and to making sense out of the actions
taken
.
One potential effect of this study is to raise the issue that JV autonomy
may be a desirable goal for the parent firms. A second contribution is the
identification of specific upward influence techniques and their impact. A
final contribution is the longitudinal analysis which allows an in-depth view
-23-
and a richer understanding of the relationship of the factors affecting JV
autonomy.
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APPENDIX
Listing of Influence Episodes in 30 Year Life of EIM Joint Venture
1. EIM obtains independent license without parental approval.
2. EIM adds new products and pays off shareholders' loan.
3. EIM adds further new products and licenses.
4. EIM modifies and improves AMC machine for local market.
b. EIM competes directly with English; major English customer decides to buy
from EIM.
6. EIM's president uses informal persuasion over several years to gain
English's compliance for EIM to sell competing product in their market.
7. EIM, under license from ACE, builds a product so superior to ACE's
original, ACE buys them from EIM.
8. EIM produces a product superior to one of Dutch's. After two years of
conflict, Dutch decides EIM's product is better and gives up fight.
9. EIM's superior technology allows them to make product better than German.
German allows EIM to sell in their market without conflict.
10. EIM's R & D department modifies additional AMC products to make them
superior for the European market.
11 - 13.
Without parental permission EIM takes three licenses from outside firms
for products well out of parents' and EIM's previous product/market scope.
14. EIM sets up wholly-owned subsidiary in Spain without parental permission,
lb. AMC attempts to gain strategic control through formal and informal
downward influence attempts. Other parents back EIM, and AMC's efforts
fail.
-28-
16. AMC purchases larger equity stake from other parents and attempts formal
and informal influence attempts in order to gain strategic control. They
are partially successful.
17. AMC replaces Mr. Casey (the entrepreneurial president of EIM) with an
administratively oriented middle manager from AMC.
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TABLE 1
European Industrial Manufacturing Company (EIM)
1946 EIM formed by seven firms: AMC 25%; ACE 25%; Relco 12%;
English 9.5%; Dutch 9.5%; French 9.5%; German 9.5%.
Basic Mission: To supply licensees of AMC with reliahle,
locally produced machines.
Management provided by:
Belco, President
Dutch, General Manager
ACE, Accountant
Technology: Each product individually designed and
manufactured; labor intensive. Location: One location near
Belco. Products: Two products initially but not the one
necessary to fulfill mission.
1956 Belco supplied president removed; Belco equity sold to Green
Co.; ACE manager Mr. Casey made President.
1956-1959 Casey increased product lines using ACE products redesigned for
European market; mission finally achieved; functional areas
expanded to include research and development, product
development, sales, and new plant locations.
1960 Casey increased ACE's equity position to 75%.
1960-1968 EIM competing directly with four parents; acquires three
additional locations.
Casey retires; Mr. Doyle, an ACE manager, now president.1968
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TABLE 1 (cont'd)
European Industrial Manufacturing Company (EIM)
1968-1978 Product Tine reduced; EIM reporting to product division within
ACE.
1978 ACE acquires additional 23%.
-31-
TABLE 2
JV Upward Influence Techniques
1. SEEKING SUPPORT FROM OUTSIDERS
Influence, coalesce and gain infornation from parental stakeholders
- Customers
- Suppliers
- Licensors
- Competitors
- Other parents
- Government
2. FORMAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH PARENTAL FIRMS
Structural Reporting Lines
Dependency on Parental Resources
Strategic Differentiation (Degree of product/market overlap)
Technology
3. INFORMAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH PARENTAL FIRMS
Playing Parents Against Each Other
Pens u as ion /Information /Trust
Establishing Separate Culture
4. JV CHARACTERISTICS
Independent Facilities
Internal Functional Areas
Separate Information Systems
Remote Physical Location
b. PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE JV MANAGER
- Entrepreneurial Leadership
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TABLE 3
Frequency and Impact of JV Upward Influence Attempts
to Control Parents and to Gain Autonomy
Frequency Impact
SEEKING SUPPORT FROM OUTSIDERS
Licensing from 3rd parties
Influence parent stakeholders
FORMAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH PARENTAL FIRMS
Strategic Differentiation
New product lines
Superior product
Direct competition with parents
Complementary product
Structural Reporting Lines
Board of directors
Negotiations
Direct reporting to parents
INFORMAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH PARENTAL FIRMS
Persuasi on/i nformat ion /trust
Establishing separate culture
Playing parents against each other
8
_3
11
7
5
2
_2
16
5
1
_2
8
8
4
_J_
16
Increase Decrease
Autonomy Autonomy
2 I
8
_2
22
6
3
_2
11
Incertai n
or no
Impact
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TABLE 3 (cont'd)
Frequency and Impact of JV Upward Influence Attempts
to Control Parents and to Gain Autonomy
Frequency Impact
JV CHARACTERISTICS
Resource Independence
R & D
Financi al
Other functional expertise
Independent facilities
Separate physical location
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF JV PRESIDENT
Entrepreneurial leadership
5
5
1
1
1
13
Uncertair
Increase Decrease or no
Autonomy Autonomy Impact
4
2
1
1
I
9
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FIGURE 3
Micro-^ap 2
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FIGURE 4
Micro-Map 3
JV leadership parental
compl i ance
JV autonomy
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FIGURE 5
Global Causal Map
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